Don’t connect it to the internet, and don’t connect it to a local network.
RELATED: Want to Survive Ransomware? Here's How to Protect Your PC How to Air Gap a Computer Andrea Leone/Īs we’ve seen, air gapping a computer is actually pretty simple: Just disconnect it from the network. If you bring an installer infected with ransomware to an air-gapped computer via a USB drive, that ransomware could still encrypt the files on your air–gapped computer and wreak havoc, demanding you connect it to the internet and pay up money before it will decrypt your data. That said, garden-variety malware could also be a problem. But they are a concern for nation-states with a nuclear program, as we’ve seen. These are all pretty sophisticated attacks-much more sophisticated than the average malware you’ll find online. That’s one of many techniques that were demonstrated at Black Hat USA 2018. (They could also involve a person physically accessing the computer, compromising it, and installing malware or modifying its hardware.)įor example, If malware was introduced onto an air-gapped computer via a USB drive and there was another infected computer nearby connected to the internet, the infected computers might be able to communicate across the air gap by transmitting high-frequency audio data using the computers’ speakers and microphones. There are other ways malware could communicate across air-gapped networks, but they all involve an infected USB drive or similar device introducing malware onto the air-gapped computer. Other Potential Threats to Air Gapped Computers Sergio Sergo/ Stuxnet was sophisticated malware designed to attack air-gapped systems-we do know that for sure. It’s widely believed that the Stuxnet worm did a lot of damage to Iran’s nuclear program and that the worm was built by the USA and Israel, but the countries involved haven’t publicly confirmed these facts.
It was designed to target specific industrial software applications. It then used other exploits to spread through air-gapped networks, since some air-gapped computers inside organizations are connected to each other but not to larger networks. It was designed to spread by infecting removable drives like USB drives, giving it the ability to cross an “air gap” when people plugged those USB drives into air-gapped computers. The sophisticated Stuxnet worm worked in this way.
This opens up a vector of attack, and it’s not a theoretical one.
For example, you might download an application on a networked computer, put it on a USB drive, take it to the air-gapped computer, and install it. For example, people often use USB drives and other removable storage devices to move files between air-gapped computers and networked computers. How Stuxnet Attacked Air Gapped ComputersĪir-gapped computers aren’t immune from threats. You’ll have maximum security and privacy for your work as long as you keep your device offline.
Or, if you’re working on sensitive business and financial data, you could use a computer that isn’t connected to the internet. Windows XP is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, but you’re not as risk as long as you keep your Windows XP system off networks and use it offline. If you still want to use that old software, the most secure way to do so is to “air gap” that Windows XP system. For example, let’s say you have some old software (or a game) that runs best on Windows XP. You could air gap computers at home, too.